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Abstract:
In this paper I argue against readings of Hertz that overly assimilate him into the thought
of late 20th century anti-realists and pluralists.
Firstly, as is well-known, various images of the same objects are possible according to
Hertz. However, I will argue that this envisaged pluralism concerns the situation before
all the evidence is considered i. e. before we can decide whether the images are correct and
appropriate. Hertz believes in final and decisive battles of the kind he participated in
while doing experiments in electrodynamics.
Secondly, I will argue that the concept of representation is still quite appropriately
applied to important aspects of images, namely when it comes to fundamental physical
equations. In this context Hertz explicitly allows that “characteristics of our image,
which claim to represent observable relations of things, do really and correctly correspond
to them” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 9).
A final consideration is Hertz’s consistent appeal to the concept of the hypothesis. I
will argue that his use of the concept does not indicate that he contributed to an increasing
hypothetization of science, if this trend is understood in a strong sense, i. e. as the belief
that the correctness of scientific theories cannot be established for principled reasons. As
mentioned, when it comes to experimental evidence Hertz believes in decisive battles.
1. Introduction
In the introduction to his The Principles of Mechanics Hertz famously
claimed:
We form ourselves images or symbols of external objects; and the form
which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images
in thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature
of the things depicted … The images we here speak of are our conceptions
of things. With the things themselves they are in conformity in one impor-
tant respect, namely, in satisfying the above-mentioned requirement. For
our purpose it is not necessary that they should be in conformity with
the things in any other respect whatever. As a matter of fact, we do not
know, nor have we any means of knowing, whether our conception of
things are in conformity with them in any other than in this one fundamen-
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tal respect … Various images of the same objects are possible, and these im-
ages may differ in various respects (Hertz [1994] (1956), 1 ff.).
On the basis of these and similar remarks some writers have made a
number of claims about Hertz’s philosophy of science that I intend to
comment on in this paper.
More particularly, I have in mind the following three claims. Firstly,
Ludwig Boltzmann argues that Hertz’s picture theory implies that it
cannot be our aim to look for an absolutely correct theory. Rather,
there might be different theories that are equally correct.1 While Boltz-
mann maybe right that Hertz’s theory has this implication, I want to
argue that this was not Hertz’s view. He conceived of the pluralism
of theories or images in mechanics as a transitory stage in the develop-
ment of science and was convinced that only one of the images can
be the correct image in mechanics. Hertz – even in The Principles of Me-
chanics – aims to identify the unique theory or image.
Secondly, Gregor Schiemann has argued:
To one reality, which Hertz, too, conceives realistically, can now corre-
spond a multiplicity of theories. The world seems remote and the concept
of representation inappropriate (Schiemann 1998, 30).
Schiemann describes this as a “loss of truth in theoretical cognition” and
as the “the loss of world in the image.”
While I think there is some truth in this picture of Hertz’s account, I
also think that the world has not been completely lost in his images. In
fact it was one of Hertz’s main objectives to figure out exactly what in a
theory represents the world (or nature) and what does not.
Thirdly, I want to deal with Schiemann’s claim that Hertz was part
of a trend in the second half of the nineteenth century towards “an in-
creasing hypothesization of scientific propositions” (Schiemann 1998,
28). While I will not deny that Hertz may have contributed to this de-
velopment (due to a reception of his writings like Boltzmann’s that mis-
construes Hertz’s views), I will argue that the notion of a “hypothesis”
and a fortiori “hypothesization” – if taken in a strong sense – is not a very
useful tool for characterizing the distinctive features of Hertz’s philoso-
phy of science.
The evidence for my claims relies on two points, which I will intro-
duce in sections 2 and 3. In section 2 I will argue that Hertz’s main ob-
1 “Daraus folgt, dass es nicht unsere Aufgabe sein kann, eine absolut richtige The-
orie … zu finden” (Boltzmann 1905, 216).
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jective in his epistemological writings was the question of separating
what in our knowledge is due to nature and what we as knowing sub-
jects have added. This is an important point because Hertz believes that
there should be an ultimate theory that separates these features. As it will
turn out, Hertz’s criteria for individuating theories allow for only one
such theory. The second observation concerns Hertz’s use of the term
“hypothesis.” In section 3 I will introduce a weak and a strong reading
of “hypothesis.” Only a strong reading of Hertz’s use of “hypothesis”
would provide evidence for his alleged pluralism. On the basis of this
distinction, and the determination of his main epistemological objective,
I will analyze his writings in electrodynamics and mechanics that touch
on the issue of hypothesis and pluralism (sections 4 and 5).
2. The Constitution of Matter
In 1884, while in Kiel as a Privatdozent, Hertz delivered a popular lec-
ture course entitled The Constitution of Matter. In the introduction to the
lecture course he discusses the relation of physics and philosophy with
respect to the question of the nature (or constitution) of matter. Accord-
ing to Hertz this used to be a genuine philosophical question. Presum-
ably he has in mind not only ancient and early modern debates, but in
particular the disputes about dynamism and atomism in the first half of
the 19th century.2
However, according to Hertz, the natural sciences had by his time
taken over the question from philosophy.
Today’s philosophy, insofar as it is based on Kant, to an increasing extent
removes the question of the constitution of matter from the sphere of its
interests and assigns it to the natural sciences, reserving for itself at most
a control over final results. There is no longer any doubt that we are
here dealing with empirical facts and things that – as in the case of the num-
ber of planets and the chemical elements – cannot be dealt with a priori
(Hertz 1999, 25).3,4
2 See (Carrier 1990).
3 “Die heutige Philosophie, so weit sie sich auf Kant stützt, scheidet immer mehr
die Frage nach der Constitution der Materie aus ihrem Interessenkreis aus und
weist sie den exacten Naturwissenschaften zu, sich höchstens eine Controlle der
letzten Resultate vorbehaltend. Es kann kein Zweifel mehr daran bestehen, daß
es sich hier rein um Erfahrungsthatsachen [handelt] sowie um Dinge, die sich so
wenig a priori entscheiden lassen, wie die Frage nach der Zahl der Planeten und
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Hertz goes on to present an overview over the advances in chemistry
and the kinetic theory of gases that provide evidence for an atomic
structure of matter. Before discussing these issues in detail (this consti-
tuting the rest of the lecture course) he deals with some objections a
philosopher might raise.
A philosopher might object that the physicist’s account cannot an-
swer the original philosophical question. Since the physicist’s atoms
are extended, the question of the constitution of matter can again be
raised with respect to the atoms themselves. Hertz essentially replies
that – while conceding that physics has transformed the original ques-
tion – physics and philosophy deal with different questions and have dif-
ferent aims. The physicist deals with the facts of nature, while the phi-
losopher deals with the difficulties the understanding has in conceiving
nature.5
What is interesting in this context is the characterization of the phi-
losopher’s project. It is the philosopher’s job “to present the facts con-
sistently and to separate which of those are due to the things themselves
and what we have added.”6 Several times in his life Hertz takes up the
question of what is due to nature or things themselves, and what is due
to us.
For instance, in a newspaper-article on von Helmholtz’s 70th birth-
day in 1891, Hertz characterizes von Helmholtz’s research in physiology
in terms of the following questions:
How is it possible for vibrations of the ether to be transformed by means of
our eyes into purely mental processes which apparently can have nothing in
common with the former; and whose relations nevertheless reflect with the
greatest accuracy the relations of external things? In the formation of men-
tal conceptions what part is played by the eye itself, by the form of the im-
der chemischen Elemente …” (The translations from Die Constitution der Mate-
rie are mine. In some cases I have consulted Jesper Lützen’s translations of some
passages.
4 For an analysis according to which both the Die Constitution der Materie as well
as The Principles of Mechanics fall into a Kantian tradition of a “metaphysics of
corporeal nature” see (Hyder 2003). For a critical discussion see (Lützen
2005, 123 ff.).
5 “Ich untersuche die Thatsachen der Natur, und Du untersuchst die Schwierig-
keiten, welche der menschliche Verstand findet, sie zu begreifen” (Hertz 1999,
32).
6 “… die Thatsachen begrifflich widerspruchsfrei darzustellen, zu sondern, was
von ihnen in den Dingen selbst liegt, und was wir hinzuthun, …” (Hertz
1999, 32).
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ages which it produces, by the nature of its colour-sensations, accommoda-
tion, motion of the eyes, by the fact that we possess two eyes? Is the mani-
fold of these relations sufficient to portray all conceivable manifolds of the
external world, to justify all manifolds of the internal world? (Hertz 1896,
336).
These questions concerning visual perception can be asked with respect
to all of knowledge. Thus Hertz continues:
We see how closely these investigations are connected with the possibility
and legitimacy of all natural knowledge. The heavens and the earth doubt-
less exist apart from ourselves, but for us they only exist insofar as we per-
ceive them. Part of what we perceive therefore appertains to ourselves: part
only has its origin in the properties of the heavens and the earth. How are
we to separate the two? (Hertz 1896, 336/7).
In what follows I will try to show that Hertz’s epistemological consid-
erations and even some of his work in theoretical physics is best under-
stood as an answer to this question: how are we to separate what is due
to the things (or to nature) from what we have added? It will become
evident that what he considers as a philosophical question at first will
turn into a question that a (theoretical) physicist has to deal with.
To return to The Constitution of Matter: Hertz’s reply to the second
philosophical objection is already an attempt to come to terms with the
issue I have just sketched. The objection concerns the properties we at-
tribute to atoms.7 It seems that we cannot attribute to atoms any of those
properties which we attribute to macroscopic objects. On the one hand,
there are sensible (secondary) properties like color, which for all we
know atoms do not have. But, on the other hand, even in the case of
other macroscopic properties like elasticity we cannot attribute them
to atoms because the main motivation for atomism is that we envisage
explanations of the macroscopic properties in terms of those of the
atoms. To attribute macroscopic properties to the atoms would under-
mine this explanatory project. So it seems that nothing remains.
Let us answer in the name of physics as follows: First, there still remains
something if we leave out everything we have imagined. There remains
a system of conceptually defined magnitudes which are connected
among themselves and to the macroscopic properties of matter via strict
mathematically formulated relations. Even if it is not allowed to consider
these for their own sake, and to attribute conceivable meanings to them,
7 For a discussion of the background of this objection see (Heidelberger 1993,
205 ff.).
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they retain their value as auxiliary magnitudes for the sake of those rela-
tions.8
This seems to be a first attempt to separate what is due to nature and
what we have added ourselves. If we subtract that which we have im-
agined (alles Gedachte), what remains is a “system of conceptually de-
fined magnitudes which are connected among themselves and with
the macroscopic properties of matter via strict mathematically formulat-
ed relations.” Hertz considers the following example:
If it is not, for example, permitted to talk about the diameter of the atom in
the strict sense, but what I call the diameter of the atom for a particular gas
retains its meaning: It is that length on the basis of which I can establish a
relationship between the heat conductivity of a gas, its internal friction, its
dielectric constant and its refractability.9
In this case the relationship that remains if we subtract everything im-
agined is that between the heat conductivity of a gas, its internal friction,
its dielectric constant and its refractability, whereas the diameter of the
atom cannot be taken to be a literal description of what there is – it is
(merely) imagined (gedacht). So there is a contrast of two kinds of fea-
tures – the relationship between heat conductivity, internal friction, etc.
can be read literally or realistically, whereas claims about the diameter of
the atom should not be read literally or realistically.
But how are we to understand the non-literal descriptions, e. g. of
the atom? Hertz considers two options. First, fictionalism: According
to Hertz, many physicists are content to consider atoms and their prop-
erties merely as useful fictions (Hülfsfictionen). According to such a
conception it is the aim of a theory to give a simple description of ob-
8 “Lassen sie uns darauf im Namen der Physik das Folgende antworten: Zunächst
bleibt immer noch etwas übrig, wenn wir alles Gedachte fortlassen. Es bleibt
übrig ein System von begrifflich definirten Größen, welche unter sich und
mit den makroskopischen Eigenschaften der Materie durch streng mathema-
tisch formulierte Beziehungen verbunden sind; ist es nicht erlaubt dieselben
um ihrer selbst willen zu betrachten, und ihnen vorstellbare Bedeutungen bei-
zulegen, so behalten sie doch ihren Werth als Hilfsgrößen um jener Beziehun-
gen willen” (Hertz 1999, 35).
9 “Ist es mir also z.B. nicht erlaubt, im eigentlichen Sinne von dem Durchmesser
eines Atoms zu reden, so behält doch das, was ich den Durchmesser eines
Atoms für ein bestimmtes Gas nenne, seine Bedeutung: es ist eine Länge,
mit deren Hülfe ich eine Beziehung zwischen Wärmeleitungsfähigkeit des
Gases, seiner inneren Reibung, seiner Dielectrizitätsconstanten und seinem
Lichtbrechungsvermögen aufzustellen vermag” (Hertz 1999, 35).
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servable phenomena. What transcends sensation is classified as a mere
fiction, a fiction that helps to achieve simplicity. Given fictionalism,
the properties we attribute to matter have to fulfill two conditions:
First, their introduction has to be consistent and, second, the calcula-
tions that ensue should be as simple as possible – “that is, they have
to be appropriate (zweckdienlich)” (Hertz 1999, 35).
The fictionalist reading, however, is not the one Hertz advocates.
Hertz does not consider the properties and relations in question to be
fictions that serve the purpose of achieving a simple description of ob-
served phenomena. Rather, he considers them to be necessary conditions
for imagination (Vorstellbarkeit). According to Hertz it is a general and
necessary condition of the human mind that we can neither represent
things intuitively (anschaulich vorstellen), nor define them conceptually
(begrifflich definieren), without adding properties (Hertz 1999, 35).
What we add are therefore not wrong conceptions, rather they are the con-
ditions for imagination. We cannot simply take them away and replace
them with better ones; rather, we either have to add them or to do without
conceptions in this realm.10
It is in this context that Hertz introduces the notion of a picture for the
first time to capture the idea that theories contain both features which
can be taken to represent reality and others which depend ultimately
on the human mind.
Thus let us guard ourselves from believing that we can investigate the na-
ture of the things themselves by considering the atoms; let us also guard
ourselves from confusing the non-essential properties, which we are forced
to ascribe to them, with the essential properties, which are merely space
and time relations. However, let them not make us believe that all labour
is lost if of the things which are real but cannot themselves enter the mind
we have made pictures, which coincide with the things in certain respects
(Beziehungen) whereas in others they depend on our conceptions.11
10 “Was wir hinzufügen sind dann nicht falsche Vorstellungen, sondern es sind die
Bedingungen der Vorstellbarkeit überhaupt; wir könnten sie nicht fortnehmen
und bessere an ihre Stelle setzen, sondern wir müssen sie hinzuthun oder auf alle
Vorstellungen in diesem Gebiete verzichten” (Hertz 1999, 36). Hertz later
changes his mind about whether these conceptions can be replaced by better
ones (replacing conceptions is his main purpose in his theoretical work on elec-
trodynamics).
11 “Hüten wir uns also zu glauben, wir könnten durch Betrachtung der Atome das
Wesen der Dinge selbst erforschen, hüten wir uns auch die unwesentlichen Ei-
genschaften, die wir ihnen nothgedrungen beilegen müssen, mit den wesentli-
chen zu verwechseln, welches lediglich Zeit- und Raumbeziehungen sind; aber
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The main point for our question is that there is a contrast between
“conceptually defined magnitudes which are connected among them-
selves and with the macroscopic properties of matter via strict mathe-
matically formulated relations” on the one hand, and conceptions (Vor-
stellungen) on the other. The strict mathematically formulated relations
are the kind of things that can be right or wrong. They represent nature.
They are what he refers to as “essential properties.” Claims about con-
ceptions, (Vorstellungen) however, such as the properties we attribute
to atoms (like having a certain diameter), cannot be read realistically,
but are nevertheless not wrong. Claims about the diameter of an atom
are neither right nor wrong according to Hertz. These conceptions are
what we add to nature or to the things themselves.
3. Hypotheses
This is a good point to introduce the notion of a hypothesis. I take a
hypothesis to be a proposition – usually consistent with what we already
know – which is introduced as an assumption to explain known phe-
nomena. A proposition can be represented by a statement and is either
true or false. There are two features of this characterization that will be
relevant for the following discussion. Hypotheses are
(i) either true or false and
(ii) assumptions, i. e. there is insufficient evidence for them.
The lack of evidence mentioned in (ii) may be either a contingent, tran-
sitory feature of the current state of science or it may be a principled
matter. The first reading as to why there is a lack of evidence is presum-
ably the common sense reading of what we mean by “hypothesis.” If
propositions are classified as hypotheses due to lack of evidence in the
non-principled sense, I will call them hypotheses in the weak sense. The
second reading can be backed up by considerations like Popper’s ac-
cording to which we are never able to verify a hypothesis. Propositions
that lack evidence for principled reasons will be called hypotheses in the
strong sense. Since the lack of evidence can only be either a matter of
lassen Sie uns auch nicht glauben, wir hätten unsere Mühe verloren, wenn wir
von den Dingen die wirklich sind, aber nicht in unseren Geist eingehen, Bilder
geschaffen haben, die mit jenen Dingen in einigen Beziehungen übereinstim-
men, während sie in anderen wieder den Stempel unserer Vorstellungen trag-
en” (Hertz 1999, 36).
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principle or not a matter of principle, it is an implication of these def-
initions that a hypothesis cannot be both a hypothesis in the weak sense
and a hypothesis in the strong sense.12
Returning to The Constitution of Matter, we can classify the claims
about the relation between conceptually defined magnitudes on the
one hand and those about the diameter of the atom on the other as fol-
lows: The latter cannot be hypotheses because they are statements that
are neither right nor wrong. This classification makes sense because –
given the characterization as necessary conditions for imagination –
they are not the kind of thing for which it is reasonable to seek evi-
dence. The former, however, (the mathematical relations) can be true
or false – they are the kind of thing for which evidence is sought.
There is no evidence in the text that indicates whether such claims
should be read as hypotheses in the weak or in the strong sense.
4. Maxwell’s Theory
Hertz’s papers on electromagnetism are particularly interesting because
they introduce a two-fold pluralism – of theories on the one hand
and representations of theories on the other. Hertz – as we will see –
believes that his work has put an end to both of these pluralisms.
In the introduction to his collection of papers on electromagnetism,
Electric Waves, Hertz characterizes his own achievements by contrasting
the situation before and after his experiments.
From the outset Maxwell’s theory excelled all others in elegance and in the
abundance of the relations between the various phenomena which it in-
cluded. The probability of this theory, and therefore the number of its ad-
herents, increased from year to year. But as long as Maxwell’s theory de-
pended solely upon the probability of its results, and not on the certainty
of its hypotheses, it could not completely displace the theories which
were opposed to it. The fundamental hypotheses of Maxwell’s theory con-
tradicted the usual views, and did not rest upon the evidence of decisive
experiments (Hertz [1892] 1962, 19).
12 For this distinction see Gregor Schiemann, “Werner Heisenberg’s position on a
hypothetical conception of science,” this volume. Hypotheses in the weak sense
correspond to Schiemann’s ‘provisional assumptions’. Hypotheses in the strong
sense imply the ‘abandonment of claims to truth’.
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So before Hertz performed his experiments there was no certainty of the
hypotheses and there were no decisive experiments.
In this connection we can best characterise the object and the result of our
experiments by saying: the object of these experiments was to test the fun-
damental hypotheses of the Faraday-Maxwell theory, and the result of the
experiments is to confirm the fundamental hypotheses of the theory (Hertz
[1892] 1962, 19/20).
Given the use of the past tense and the contrast of the epistemological
situation before and after his experiments, I take it that Hertz wants to
say that the decisive evidence sought for in Maxwell’s theory has now
been found.
Let me briefly comment on Hertz’s use of “hypothesis” in this con-
text. He frequently uses the term “hypothesis” in the Electric Waves.
Thus, for example, he refers to the hypothesis that light-waves are iden-
tical to electromagnetic waves (Hertz [1892] 1962, 19, 136). He fur-
thermore classifies Maxwell’s equations as “hypotheses” as long as his
experiments had not taken place (Hertz [1892] 1962, 19). So the ques-
tion arises whether Hertz takes hypotheses in the weak or in the strong
sense. Given the quotations above it is not very plausible to claim that
Hertz believed that Maxwell’s equations lacked evidence for principled
reasons. On the contrary, it seems plausible to assume that Hertz be-
lieves that the question of the fundamental equations of electrodynamics
has been settled with his experiments. Maxwell’s equations used to be
hypotheses in the weak sense.
But what exactly has been so decisively confirmed? What is it that we
call the Faraday-Maxwell theory?” Hertz famously answered:
To the question “What is Maxwell’s theory?” I know of no shorter or
more definite answer than the following: – Maxwell’s theory is Maxwell’s
system of equations. Every theory which leads to the same system of equa-
tions, … I would consider as being a form or special case of Maxwell’s
theory; every theory which leads to different equations, … is a different
theory(Hertz [1892] 1962, 21).
What has been confirmed are the mathematically formulated relations
between physical magnitudes, (to use the terminology of his The Con-
stitution of Matter) namely Maxwell’s equations.
With respect to the issue of pluralism it should be pointed out that
before Hertz performed his experiments there used to be a pluralism of
theories (fundamental equations for electro-dynamic phenomena). This
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pluralism has now disappeared. Hertz believes that there is decisive evi-
dence against competing theories such as Weber’s. So the pluralism of
theories has turned out to be transitory.
Furthermore, it follows from Hertz’s views that there cannot be a
pluralism of theories in the future. The reason is this: The evidence
Hertz provides is decisive evidence for Maxwell’s equation. A fortiori
an electromagnetic theory either yields Maxwell’s equations, or it is
wrong. But by definition every theory that yields these equations is
identical with Maxwell’s theory. So a pluralism of theories that takes ac-
count of the evidence is impossible.
The pluralism of theories is not the only pluralism Hertz discusses.
He contrasts Maxwell’s theory with its representations. Hertz distin-
guishes three representations of Maxwell’s theory: Maxwell’s represen-
tation, the representation as a limiting case in von Helmholtz’s electro-
dynamics and his own. All of these are representations of the same inner
significance or content (Inhalt). What is common to all of these repre-
sentations is the system of Maxwell’s equations. For a representation to
be a representation of Maxwell’s theory it is both a necessary and suffi-
cient condition to yield these equations. Representations add physical
significance to the system of equations by invoking physical conceptions
(Vorstellungen) such as “pictures of electrified atoms” or “concrete rep-
resentations (Vorstellungen) of the various conceptions as to the nature
of electric polarisation, the electric current etc.” (Hertz [1892] 1962,
19). As Michael Heidelberger points out, the representation (the phys-
ical conception) “designates the ultimate unobservable agent which pro-
duces the phenomena” (Heidelberger 1998, 18). For example, in the
case of one body acting on another at a distance, Hertz distinguishes
four fundamental conceptions (standpoints): “the pure conception of di-
rect attraction,” the pure conception of indirect (or mediated) attrac-
tion, as well as two intermediary conceptions. These are claims about
the microphysical causes of the observable phenomena.
We have a plurality of fundamental conceptions (standpoints) about
apparent action at a distance in the case electro-dynamic phenomena.
The different representations of Maxwell’s theory (there are three of
them) rely on several of these possible standpoints (Hertz discusses
four standpoints). Von Helmholtz’s, Maxwell’s and Hertz’s own repre-
sentation make use of these fundamental conceptions.
With respect to the first standpoint (the pure conception of direct
attraction) Hertz is very explicit that it has been rejected:
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Casting now a glance backwards we see that by the experiments above
sketched the propagation in time of a supposed action-at-a-distance is for
the first time proved. This fact forms the philosophic results of the experi-
ments; and, indeed, in a certain sense the most important result. The proof
includes a recognition of the fact that the electric forces can disentangle
themselves from material bodies, and can continue to subsist as conditions
or changes in the state of space (Hertz [1892] 1962, 19).
Hertz explicitly points out that this result is independent of the correct-
ness of a particular theory. Thus, his experiments have not only impli-
cations for competing theories, but also for competing fundamental
conceptions. On the one hand, they provide decisive evidence for Max-
well’s equations, on the other hand they demonstrate that the fourth
standpoint (action is mediated) is not only possible but actually obtains.
Thus claims about fundamental conceptions are not beyond the reach of
experimental evidence.
Let me come back to the plurality of representations. Hertz criticizes
von Helmholtz’s representation, which makes use of one of the inter-
mediary standpoints:
It assumes that the action of the two separate bodies is not determined sole-
ly by forces acting directly at a distance. It rather assumes that the forces
induce changes in the space (supposed to be nowhere empty), and that
these again give rise to new distance forces (Hertz [1892] 1962, 23).
In the limit of diminishing distance forces von Helmholtz’s theory yields
Maxwell’s equations. It is thus a representation of Maxwell’s theory.
However, Hertz objects that “it is impossible to deny the existence of
distance forces, and at the same time to regard them as the cause of
the polarizations” (Hertz [1892] 1962, 25). So Hertz rejects von Helm-
holtz’s representation because the physical conceptions it invokes are in-
consistent.
Maxwell’s own representation is – according to Hertz – an incon-
sistent mixture of the fourth standpoint and the second standpoint. (I
will not go into the details here.) Hertz own representation is the at-
tempt to disentangle the conceptions that Maxwell used in his represen-
tation. Hertz attempts to
exhibit Maxwell’s theory, i. e. Maxwell’s equations from this fourth stand-
point. I have endeavoured to avoid from the beginning the introduction of
any conceptions which are foreign to this standpoint and which might af-
terwards have to be removed (Hertz [1892] 1962, 27).
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Hertz describes some of the conceptions that characterize Maxwell’s
own representation:
Maxwell originally developed his theory with the aid of very definite and
special conceptions as to the nature of electrical phenomena. He assumed
that the pores of the ether and of all bodies were filled with an attenuated
fluid, which, however, could not exert forces at a distance (Hertz [1892]
1962, 27).
He characterized his theoretical papers as the attempt to develop a rep-
resentation of the system of Maxwell’s equation that can do without
pictorial conceptions (Vorstellungen) of the kind just mentioned:
I have … endeavoured in the exposition to limit as far as possible the num-
ber of those conceptions which are arbitrarily introduced by us, and only to
admit such elements as cannot be removed or altered without at the same
time altering possible experimental results (Hertz [1892] 1962, 28).
Hertz wants to do without those conceptions that are part of the second
standpoint. Maxwell’s theory should be presented entirely from the
point of the fourth standpoint.
It is true that in consequence of these endeavours, the theory acquires a
very abstract and colourless appearance … But scientific accuracy requires
of us that we should in no wise confuse the simple and homely figure, as it
is presented to us by nature, with the gay garment which we use to clothe
it. Of our own free will we can make no change whatever in the form of
the one, but the cut and colour of the other we can choose as we please
(Hertz [1892] 1962, 28).
Hertz considered the issue of separating what is due to nature on the one
hand and, on the other, what we have added on as a philosophical ques-
tion in The Constitution of Matter. It was therefore a question the phys-
icist did not have to deal with. In the “Introduction” to his Electric
Waves this question has now been transformed into a question that a
(theoretical) physicist needs to deal with. It was important for Hertz
to contrast “the simple and homely figure, as it is presented to us by na-
ture” and “the gay garment which we use to clothe it.” Though there is
some interpretative controversy about what exactly the “gay garment”
and the “simple and homely figure” refer to, it is important to notice
that there is such a distinction.13 On the one hand there are certain fea-
13 (Heidelberger 1998, 21) and (Lützen 2005, 106), see also the discussion in sec-
tion 6.1.
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tures which represent nature, while on the other hand those which have
no such function.
What seems to be clear is that Maxwell’s equations ought to be read
realistically, i. e. that they represent nature. It should be equally clear that
the physical conceptions, which belong to the second standpoint and
which have been eliminated, belong to what Hertz calls the “gay gar-
ment.” They are those conceptions that have been arbitrarily added
by us (or rather by Maxwell).
Let me summarize those points that are relevant for the issues we
discussed at the outset.
First, Hertz uses the notion of “hypothesis” frequently but he uses it
in the weak sense only. There is no evidence in the texts we have dis-
cussed so far that there are parts of theories that are both, either true or
false as well as in principle beyond the reach of empirical evidence.
Second, what Hertz ends up with is a distinction between the simple
and homely figure as it is presented by nature on the one hand, and the
gay garment on the other. Those parts of theories that are constitutive of
the former represent nature. The concept of representation is therefore
still an appropriate concept to characterize the relation between theory
and nature – at least to some extent.
Finally, both the pluralism with respect to theories as well as the plu-
ralism with respect to representations turned out to be transitory. The
plurality among theories was narrowed down to one by Hertz’s experi-
ments (and his criterion for individuating theories ensures that there
cannot be more than one theory); the plurality of representations by in-
voking criteria such as consistency (in the case of von Helmholtz) and
simplicity or economy (in the case of Maxwell). However, whether
or not physical conceptions and thus representations are defensible is
also a matter of empirical consideration, as Hertz’s remark about the
most important result of his experiments (propagation in time of an al-
leged action at a distance force) indicates.
5. The Principles of Mechanics
Finally, I will discuss the questions outlined at the outset with respect to
The Principles of Mechanics. The central term Hertz invokes in this con-
text is that of an image (Bild, “picture” would have been a better trans-
lation). This is significant because in The Constitution of Matter Hertz had
used two metaphors in the context of characterizing how we talk about
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nature: the notion of a sign and that of an image. In the context of a
discussion of the concept of matter he had introduced the notion of a
sign:
I compare [the concept of] matter with paper-money, which our under-
standing issues in order to organize its relations to the things. Paper-
money is a sign for something else, and precisely on the fact that it is a
sign depends its value and meaning. Its own character is irrelevant …14
At other times, as we have seen, he invoked the notion of a picture:
[O]f the things, which are real but cannot themselves enter the mind, we
have made pictures, which coincide with the things in certain respects
whereas in others they depend on our conceptions (Hertz 1999, 36).
(See above for full quote.)
Even though Hertz uses the notion of sign (Zeichen) or symbol occa-
sionally in the “Introduction” to his The Principles of Mechanics, image
is the predominant concept he makes use of. This is significant because
the two metaphors suggest different claims with respect to the question
to what extent the world is represented. Whereas “picture” in Hertz’s
terminology implies that there is a correspondence (or coincidence)
with the things pictured in certain respects (but not in others), Hertz’s
characterization of a sign is less explicit in this respect.
Choosing picture or image rather than sign as the main conceptual
tool can therefore be taken as a first indication that Hertz still believes
that certain aspects of nature can be represented.
5.1 Images
In order to come to terms with the questions sketched at the outset of
this paper I will now analyze Hertz’s concept of an image, as he used it
in The Principles of Mechanics.
According to Hertz, we introduce images when we try to predict
phenomena, i. e. what he calls the “most direct, and in a sense most im-
14 “Ich vergleiche die Materie mit einem Papiergeld, welches unser Verstand aus-
giebt, um seine Beziehungen zu den Dingen zu regeln. Das Papiergeld ist ein
Zeichen für etwas anderes und gerade in diesem, daß es ein Zeichen ist, liegt
sein Wert und seine Bedeutung. Seine eigene Beschaffenheit ist gleichgültig
… (Hertz 1999, 117/8). Hertz was familiar with von Helmholtz’s theory of
signs (see Schiemann 1998).
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portant, problem which our conscious knowledge of nature should en-
able us to solve” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 1):
We form for ourselves images or symbols of external objects ; and the form
which we give them is such that the necessary consequents of the images in
thought are always the images of the necessary consequents in nature of the
things pictured (Hertz [1894] 1956, 1).
The first thing to be noted is that Hertz makes use of the concept of an
image in a narrow and in a broad sense. Images in the narrow sense are
parts of theories that refer to particular things in nature. This is the sense
in which the concept of a symbol or image is used in the above quota-
tion. When he compares the different images of ordinary mechanics it is
rather theories as a whole that he has in mind. The above-quoted re-
quirement for images is valid both for the narrow sense as well as for
the broad, as becomes clear in the sequel of the introduction where
he exclusively deals with images in the broad sense (see Hüttemann
2001).
But how do we compare consequents of images with consequents of
things? What are the constitutive elements of images? Hertz refers to
fundamental ideas and to principles which connect the ideas as the main
elements that are characteristic for a particular image. Principles of me-
chanics are defined as
[a]ny selection from amongst such and similar propositions, which satisfies
the requirement that the whole of mechanics can be developed from it by
purely deductive reasoning without any further appeal to experience (Hertz
[1894] 1956, 4).
The whole experiential content of a theory is captured by its principles.
The examples of images Hertz discusses in the “Introduction” of his
The Principles of Mechanics are the customary exposition (Darstellung) of
mechanics, which is characterized through the fundamental ideas of
space, time, mass and force as well as Newton’s laws of mechanics
and d’Alembert’s Principle. The ideas of space, time, mass and energy
plus Hamilton’s Principle constitute the “energetical” image. Hertz’s
own image presupposes just three fundamental ideas – space, time and
mass – plus a fundamental law that serves as his principle.
Still, the question remains: How are we to compare whether “the
necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the images
of the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured.” The
first book of The Principles of Mechanics does not deal with this problem;
it treats the fundamental ideas and introduces definitions without mak-
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ing any reference to experience. “The subject matter of the first book is
completely independent of experience” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 45). It is
only in the second book that such a connection is established. At the
beginning of the second book Hertz introduces three rules (Festsetzun-
gen) for his fundamental ideas. The first of these rules concerns time:
Rule 1. We determine the duration of time by means of a chronometer,
from the number of beats of its pendulum. The unit of duration is settled
by arbitrary convention (Hertz [1894] 1956, 140).
There are similar rules for space and mass. Hertz seems to think of them
as providing definite and determinate values for a determinable.
So what we see is that over and above the fundamental ideas and
principles these rules are constitutive for the concept of an image as
well:
Thus only through these rules can the symbols (Zeichen) time, space and
mass become parts of our images of external objects. Again, only by
these three rules are they subjected to further demands than are necessitated
by our thought (Hertz [1894] 1956, 141).
By these rules the images become images of external things.
In the “Introduction” to the Electric Waves Hertz distinguished between
Maxwell’s theory on the one hand and its representations on the other.
How does the concept of an image connect to these concepts?
Hertz introduces the notion of an image or picture as follows: “The
images which we here speak of are our conceptions (Vorstellungen) of
things” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 1). So one might hold – as Michael Heidel-
berger does (Heidelberger 1998, 21) – that an image is the same thing as
a representation in the Electric Waves, because – as we have seen – rep-
resentations were essentially constituted by conceptions. However, if
one takes into account how Hertz spells out in detail what belongs to
the different images of mechanics (image is here taken in the broad
sense), there is a conspicuous absence of what Heidelberger has called
“the ultimate unobservable agent which produces the phenomena”
(Heidelberger 1998, 18). What constitutes images are the fundamental
concepts, the fundamental equations formulated in terms of these con-
cepts plus the rules (Festsetzungen). Jesper Lützen points out that this
difference, i. e. the presence of conceptions concerning ultimate agents
explaining the phenomena in the Electric Waves and their absence in The
Principles of Mechanics, maybe due to the fact that mechanics as opposed
to electrodynamics is the fundamental physical theory. In electrodynam-
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ics we can develop conceptions (Vorstellungen) of polarization, etc., in
terms of mechanical concepts so as to explain electrodynamical phe-
nomena. In the case of mechanics we cannot develop conceptions in
terms of more fundamental concepts (see Lützen 2005, 106).
This observation plus the role fundamental equations play both in
Hertz’s characterization of Maxwell’s theory as well as in the images
provides evidence for the claim that “image” is more of a successor of
“theory” than of “representation.” Nevertheless, besides the fundamen-
tal equations, which he took to be constitutive for Maxwell’s theory, he
adds some further constituents of images such as the fundamental con-
cepts and the rules (Festsetzungen). There is one further element that
seems to give some support for Heidelberger’s reading, namely the hid-
den masses that Hertz postulates. These masses have some similarities
with the conceptions discussed in the Electric Waves. However, Hertz
nowhere refers to the hidden masses as an image. They are a part of
an image, not an image themselves.
The plurality of images we envisage in The Principles of Mechanics is a
plurality of fundamental mechanical equations, sets of fundamental con-
cepts plus some auxiliary hypotheses (such as the hypothesis concerning
hidden masses). There is no longer a two-folded pluralism (of theories
and of representations) as there was in the Electric Waves.
5.2 Criteria for the Evaluation of Images
Whether Hertz’s pluralism is transitory is an issue that concerns the cri-
teria for evaluating the images. The question is whether Hertz believes
that these criteria will ultimately single out a unique image.
Hertz introduces three criteria for the evaluation of images: correct-
ness, permissibility and appropriateness. Let me turn to correctness first.
Correctness is the requirement that Hertz mentions in the passage we
quoted at the very beginning: “the necessary consequents of the images
in thought” have to be “the images of the necessary consequents in na-
ture of the things pictured” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 1).
What are the implications of a theory’s correctness? Immediately
following the above quotation Hertz continues: “In order that this re-
quirement may be satisfied, there must be a certain conformity (Über-
einstimmung) between nature and thought” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 1).
But what sort of conformity does Hertz have in mind? A few pages
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later Hertz discusses the customary image of mechanics and, in particu-
lar, the fundamental law’s credentials with respect to correctness:
Upon the correctness of the image under consideration we can pronounce
judgment more easily … No one will deny that within the whole range of
experience up to the present the correctness is perfect ; that all those char-
acteristics of our image, which claim to represent observable relations of
things, do really and correctly correspond to them (Hertz [1894] 1956, 9).
Hertz claims that if an image is correct we are allowed to conclude that
systems really correspond to our image so far as the fundamental law is
concerned.15 Hertz reaffirms his realism with respect to the fundamental
mathematical equations.16
As in his earlier writings Hertz keeps to the view that certain parts of
theories or images, if correct, represent nature. Pace Schiemann (1999) I
hold that the concept of representation is still appropriate for character-
izing Hertz’s views about the relation of images and the world – at least
with respect to fundamental equations.
The question of whether or not an image is correct is essentially a
matter of whether or not the fundamental law is correct:
[The experiential part] , in so far as it is not already contained in the funda-
mental ideas, will be comprised in a single general statement which we shall
take for our Fundamental Law. No further appeal is made to experience.
The question of the correctness of our statements is thus coincident with
the question of correctness or general validity of that single statement
(Hertz [1894] 1956, 139, translation augmented).
This fundamental law is a hypothesis in the weak sense. Hertz considers
it “provable” – at least by future experience:
We consider the law to be the probable outcome of most general experi-
ence. More strictly, the law is stated as a hypothesis or assumption, which
comprises many experiences, which is not contradicted by any experience,
but which asserts more than can be proved by definite experience at the
present time (Hertz [1894] 1956, 145).
15 There seems to be one caveat. Hertz talks about observable relations, not about
relations in general. There is, however, no evidence that Hertz has in mind the
observable/unobservable distinction as it was discussed in 20th-century philoso-
phy of science. Rather, as in the case of “experience,” his use seems fairly liberal
and seems to comprise everything that is within the reach of experimentation.
16 This kind of realism is sometimes called “structural realism”; see (Ladyman
1998).
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To sum up: Images ought to be correct – that is why we construct them
in the first place. What this boils down to essentially17 is the requirement
that the fundamental law has to be correct. A fundamental law or prin-
ciple – if not yet confirmed – is a hypothesis in the weak sense only; it
can – at least in principle – be decisively confirmed.18 Hertz is very ex-
plicit that these hypotheses are either right or wrong. Comparing his
image of mechanics with the customary image Hertz writes:
… it is important to observe that only the one or the other of the two im-
ages can be correct: they cannot both at the same time be correct … This is
the field in which the decisive battle between these different fundamental
assumptions of mechanics must be fought out (Hertz [1894] 1956, 40/41).
Hertz does believe that there will be a battle between the various images
and he believes that the battle will be decisive. Thus there will be a de-
cisive answer to the question whether one or the other theory is correct.
One thing we learn from this is that Hertz did not believe that im-
ages are hypotheses in a strong sense – i. e. hypotheses that we are unable
to provide sufficient evidence for some principled reason.
The above quote, however, does not yet imply that Hertz consid-
ered the pluralism of images he described as merely transitory. Hertz in-
troduces two further criteria for the evaluation of images. These are the
criteria of permissibility and appropriateness. An image is permissible if it
does not contradict the laws of our thought, i. e. if it is logically consis-
tent. Images, which contradict laws of thought, are inadmissible. Hertz
holds that “two permissible and correct images of the same external ob-
jects may yet differ in respect of appropriateness” (Hertz [1894] 1956,
2).
An image can be appropriate in two respects. Firstly, it can be more
appropriate than another image because it is more distinct. This is the
case if it “pictures more of the essential relations of the object” than
its competitor (Hertz [1894] 1956, 2). What Hertz has in mind can
17 I write “essentially” because Hertz introduces further empirical hypotheses, e. g.
the hypothesis of concealed masses and certain assumptions about the continuity
of nature (Hertz [1894] 1956, 146).
18 There is one passage where Hertz claims that “that which can be derived from
experience can be annulled through experience” (Hertz [1894] 1956, 9). This,
however, should not be taken to indicate that Hertz believes in hypotheses in
the strong sense. As the immediately preceding passage makes clear, what Hertz
wants to claim is simply that our evaluations of correctness can take into ac-
count only past (and present) experiences. So our evaluations might be revised
in the light of future experiments.
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best be illustrated by his discussion of the customary image of mechan-
ics. We know of essential features of forces which are not an integral
part of the customary picture of mechanics. Therefore, it is not as dis-
tinct as Hertz’s own image.
Of natural motions, forces and fixed connections we can predicate more
than the accepted fundamental laws do. Since the middle of this century
we have been firmly convinced that no forces actually exist in nature
which would involve a violation of the principle of conservation of energy
… Again these elementary forces are not free. We can assert as a property
which they are generally admitted to possess, that they are independent of
place and time (Hertz [1894] 1956, 10).
Secondly, an image may be more appropriate than another if it is more
simple, i. e. if it contains “in addition to the essential characteristics, the
smaller number of superfluous or empty relations” (Hertz [1894] 1956,
2). Again, what Hertz means by this criterion can best be illustrated by
his discussion of the role of forces in the customary picture.
We see a piece of iron resting upon a table, and we accordingly imagine
that no causes of motion – no forces – are there present. Physics, which
is based on the mechanics considered here and necessarily determined by
its basis, teaches us otherwise. Through the force of gravitation every
atom of the iron is attracted by every other atom in the universe. But
every atom of the iron is magnetic, and is thus connected by fresh forces
with every other magnetic atom in the universe. Again, bodies in the uni-
verse contain electricity in motion, and this latter exerts further complicat-
ed forces which attract every atom of the iron. In so far as the parts of the
iron contain themselves electricity, we have fresh forces to take into con-
sideration; and in addition to these again various kinds of molecular forces.
Some of these forces are not small : if only a part of these forces were ef-
fective, this part would suffice to tear the iron to pieces. But in fact, all
the forces are so adjusted among each other that the effect of the whole
lot is zero; that in spite of a thousand existing causes of motion, no motion
takes place; that the iron remains at rest. Now if we place these conceptions
before unprejudiced persons, who will believe us? (Hertz [1894] 1956, 13).
An image of mechanics (such as Hertz’s own), which avoids such forces,
is a simpler image of mechanics.
Images will picture typically essential as well as inessential relations.
As we have seen, Hertz advocates a realistic attitude towards essential
relations (mathematical structure). Claims about these essential relations
– if not already confirmed – are hypotheses in the weak sense.
With respect to the inessential or empty relations Hertz holds:
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Empty relations cannot be altogether avoided: they enter into the images
because they are simply images, – images produced by our mind and nec-
essarily affected by the characteristics of its mode of portrayal (Hertz [1894]
1956, 2).
At this point we have to draw the same conclusion we drew with re-
spect to what Hertz called the “inessential relations” in The Constitution
of Matter. Claims concerning these ineliminable empty relations are nei-
ther right nor wrong. They are not the kind of things for which evi-
dence is possible. They are therefore no hypotheses – neither in the
weak nor in the strong sense.
It is exactly with respect to these features of images that Schiemann’s
claim concerning the limited applicability of the concept of representa-
tion is correct. Empty relations do not represent anything.
Let me come back to the issue of pluralism. As I already mentioned,
Hertz believes that images do not only differ with respect to correctness
and permissibility but also with respect to appropriateness. Whether or
not an image is permissible and whether or not it is correct are questions
that allow for decisive answers (though his discussions of the details of
the images shows that it is not so easy to figure out to what extent an
image in fact conforms to these criteria).
The striking thing is that – despite certain ambiguities – Hertz seems
to believe that ultimately it will be possible to find a unique image,
which does best with respect to appropriateness.
…we cannot decide without ambiguity whether an image is appropriate or
not; as to this difference of opinion may arise. One image may be more
suitable for one purpose, another for another; only by gradually testing
can we finally succeed in obtaining the most appropriate (Hertz [1894]
1956, 3).
6. Conclusion
According to Hertz different images of mechanics are possible. But this
envisaged pluralism concerns the situation before all the evidence is in,
i. e. before we can decide whether the images are correct and appropri-
ate. There is no place at which Hertz suggests that there might be a plu-
rality of images that equally conforms to all three criteria. Hertz believes
in final and decisive battles of the kind he participated in while doing
experiments in electrodynamics.
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Admittedly, Hertz’s rhetoric in The Principles of Mechanics sounds
much more pluralistic than in the Electric Waves. This is presumably
due to the fact that in The Principles of Mechanics he defends a minority
view of mechanics. The pluralistic rhetoric is a way of introducing the
image of mechanics he favors. At the end of the day, however, accord-
ing to Hertz there will be a decisive battle and the stage of pluralism will
a fortiori turn out to be transitory – just as it was the case in electrody-
namics. So Boltzmann misrepresents Hertz’s views when he claims that
Hertz’s picture theory implies that it cannot be our aim to look for an
absolutely correct theory.
We have also seen that the concept of representation is still quite ap-
propriately applied to important aspects of images. Hertz explicitly al-
lows that “characteristics of our image, which claim to represent observ-
able relations of things, do really and correctly correspond to them”
(Hertz [1894] 1956, 9). More particularly, he thinks of the fundamental
equations at this point.
Finally: Hertz uses the concept of a hypothesis throughout his work.
But he uses it in a weak sense. When it comes to experimental evidence
Hertz believes in decisive battles, as we have seen. There is no trend in
Hertz towards an increasing hypothesization – given this trend is under-
stood in a strong sense, i. e. as leading to a conception according to
which the correctness of scientific theories cannot be established for
principled reasons.
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